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Notes
Criminal Nonsupport and a Proposal for an Effective
Felony-Misdemeanor Distinction
Over the years, different programs have been instituted on both the
state and federal levels to deal with the problem of nonsupport of chil-
dren. For example, every state has enacted the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act ("Act") or a substantially similar statute.1
Furthermore, all states impose criminal sanctions for a parent's failure to
provide support for his or her child.2 These measures, however, have not
proven to be as effective as hoped, and nonsupport remains a very serious
problem in this country: fifty-three percent of all children entitled to
child support do not receive the full amount ordered by the courts.
3
The problem of childhood poverty demands close and immediate
attention because it seriously affects our society in two ways. First, when
children are forced into poverty by their parents' failure to provide sup-
port, the state, that is, the taxpayer, bears the burden of providing that
support through welfare payments. One of the primary causes of child-
hood poverty in this country is nonsupport by parents.4 In 1981, over
6.5 million children in female-headed, single-parent families in the
United States were living below the poverty level,5 and the poverty rate
1. 9A U.L.A. 647-746 (1979). See F. HARPER & J. SKOLNICK, PROBLEMS OF THE
FAMILY 235 (1962). In California, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was
adopted in 1951 and is now the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of
1968. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1650-1699.4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
2. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1985). Criminal statutes in all 50
states and the District of Columbia make it either a felony or a misdemeanor for a man to
neglect his children. F. KUCHLER, LAW OF SUPPORT 34 (3d ed. 1980).
Although the California Constitution proscribes imprisonment in a civil action for debt,
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10, imprisonment for failure to provide child support is constitutional
because the obligation is not a debt, and prosecution under section 270 is not a civil action.
Lyons v. Municipal Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 829, 839-40, 142 Cal. Rptr. 449,453 (1977); People
v. Champion, 30 Cal. App. 463, 465, 158 P. 501, 502 (1916).
3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 124, CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 2 (1981) (Advance Report) [hereinafter cited as CHILD SUPPORT].
4. See infra notes 47-58 & accompanying text. The official poverty level is defined by
the Department of Agriculture. See infra note 46 & accompanying text.
5. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 140,
MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE U.S. 22 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as MONEY INCOME].
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for these families was higher than for any other family type.6 In Califor-
nia, where the welfare rate is the third highest in the nation,7 nonsupport
is a particularly expensive problem. Second, and more importantly,
childhood poverty prevents children, one of our most precious resources,
from realizing their full potential.
The nonsupport problem in California has been aggravated further
by a recent decision. In People v. Gregori,8 the California Court of Ap-
peal for the Fourth District held that California Penal Code section 270,
which makes failure to provide child support either a misdemeanor or a
felony, is unconstitutional. As a result of this decision, a parent's failure
to provide child support can no longer be prosecuted as a felony.
The seriousness of the nonsupport problem demands that the felony-
misdemeanor distinction be reinstated by amendment of section 270. A
felony-misdemeanor distinction in the nonsupport statute would help
solve the problem of nonsupport in two ways. First, and most impor-
tantly, such a distinction would deter potential violators and encourage
law enforcement officials to enforce the statute more strictly.9 It would
clearly indicate to potential violators and law enforcement officials that
the State of California regards nonsupport as a serious offense. Second,
certain procedural advantages resulting from such a distinction would
increase judicial control over and facilitate prosecution of those charged
with or convicted of nonsupport.' 0 Finally, reinstitution of a felony pen-
alty would comport with the California Legislature's clearly expressed
intent to provide for a felony-misdemeanor distinction."
This Note first discusses the statutory changes pertaining to the
existence and enforcement of the duty to support one's children that have
replaced the common law, both in California and at the federal level.
The Note next discusses the recent trend toward decreased public re-
sponsibility for children and demonstrates how this is evidenced by the
alarmingly high poverty rate among female-headed households. The
Note argues that this poverty rate is a direct result of nonsupport.
After analyzing the Gregori decision and its impact on the problem
of nonsupport, the Note argues that, without any felony-misdemeanor
distinction, the statute does not adequately reflect the state's interest in
promoting parental responsibility for children and fails to alleviate the
problems presented by nonsupport. The Note concludes that the legisla-
ture should amend section 270 to reinstate the felony-misdemeanor dis-
tinction. By basing this distinction on the length of time the parent fails
6. Id. at 20.
7. See infra note 60.
8. 144 Cal. App. 3d 353, 192 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1983).
9. See infra notes 84-122 & accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 123-32 & accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 133-42 & accompanying text.
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to provide support, the amended statute would pass constitutional mus-
ter. Moreover, it would deter and punish the kind of behavior most det-
rimental to children and help to alleviate the serious problem of
nonsupport. 
12
History and Application of Child Support Laws
Although a parent's duty to provide for his children has been de-
scribed as a natural one, 13 at common law it was only a moral obligation;
a father had no legal obligation to support his children. 14 Under the
customary method for enforcing this moral obligation of support, the
mother bought what the children needed and charged it to the father.
The father then was responsible directly to the merchant under a quasi-
agency theory.' 5
Today, state civil1 6 and criminal1 7 statutes codify the duty to pro-
vide support for one's children. All fifty states have adopted the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 8 or a substantially similar stat-
ute, to provide for enforcement of the duty to provide child support.19
The Act facilitates enforcement of child support obligations when the
custodial, or obligee, parent and the noncustodial, or obligor, parent live
12. The amendment proposed by this Note is not intended as a panacea. The author
recognizes that many other reforms may be needed in the area of child welfare. The proposal
in this Note, however, is an attempt to deal with the very specific problem resulting from the
Gregori decision.
13. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447.
14. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 187
(1968). California codified this obligation in 1872. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West 1982) (his-
torical note). The moral obligation, of course, fell on the mother as well as the father. As a
matter of convenience, this Note will use the pronoun "he" in referring to the obligor parent,
and "she" in reference to the obligee. The author does not suggest that nonsupport is a
uniquely masculine crime.
15. H. CLARK, supra note 14, at 189. A quasi-agency, not an agency, arose because the
husband was liable for the debt whether he had authorized his wife to make the purchases or
not.
16. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West 1982).
17. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1985); see supra note 2.
18. 9A U.L.A. 647-746 (1979).
19. See supra note 1 & accompanying text. In addition to the Act, the California Legisla-
ture has enacted several other statutes directed at enforcing parental support obligations. For
example, courts have jurisdiction to order either or both parents to make support payments,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1986), and, if necessary, to order that those payments be
made by wage assignments. Id. § 4701. Recognizing that the problem of childhood poverty is
to some extent, if not largely, a problem of nonsupport, see infra notes 47-48 & accompanying
text, California has designated the Department of Social Services as the single organizational
unit for administering the state plan for securing child support. CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE
§ 11475 (West Supp. 1986). In addition, the district attorney in each county is responsible for
enforcing support obligations, id. § 11475.1, and the county is automatically assigned a
child's support rights when the child receives public assistance. Id. § 11477(a).
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in different states.20 The obligee parent may commence a civil action to
enforce a child support obligation in her home state and obtain a decree
ordering payment by the obligor parent without the necessity of either
suing in another state or seeking the extradition of the obligor parent.
21
As with all other states, California imposes criminal sanctions for a
parent's failure to provide child support. As originally enacted in 1872,
California Penal Code section 270 made failure to provide child support
a misdemeanor.22 In 1939, section 270 was amended to include a felony-
misdemeanor distinction:2 3 failure to provide child support was a misde-
meanor, but a father could be charged with a felony if he remained out of
California for thirty days without providing support, or for ten days if he
was in violation of a court order to provide child support.2 4 In 1970, the
20. These same procedures are used when the parents live in different counties within the
same state. UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 33, 9A U.L.A. 737
(1979).
21. See id. §§ 1, 5, 18-20, 24, 9A U.L.A. 648, 664, 694-95, 698-99, 700, 713-14 (1979). In
addition to the interstate provisions, Congress created a federal system for enforcing support
obligations, locating absent parents, and establishing paternity. This program was established
in 1975 by an amendment to the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397(f) (1982 & Supp.
I 1984). The amendment, the Child Support Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat.
2351 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)), established a
separate unit within the Department of Health and Human Services charged with assisting
states in implementing enforcement programs. 42 U.S.C. § 652 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). It
also created a federal Parent Locator Service, id. § 653, which allows any authorized person,
for example, a district attorney, a court, or the obligee parent, access to the last known ad-
dress of the obligor parent as contained in any federal agency or department file. Id. States
are encouraged to participate in the program through an incentive system that partially reim-
burses them for the costs of participation in the program, id. § 655, and pays the states a
percentage of the money they collect that would otherwise go to the federal government as
reimbursement for its share of assistance paid to the family. Id. § 658. The Child Support
Enforcement Act has since been amended to authorize garnishment of wages, Act of May 23,
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 501(c), 91 Stat. 158 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 661
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984)), and collection of past-due support from federal tax refunds. Act of
Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2331(a), 95 Stat. 860 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 664 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)). In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury may, upon request
from a federal, state, or local child support enforcement agency, provide information about the
tax return of an individual against whom enforcement is sought. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(l)(6)(A)
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970) (historical note).
23. In California, whether a crime is considered a misdemeanor or a felony is determined
by the place of imprisonment. Generally, a crime punishable by imprisonment in a state
prison is classified as a felony. All other offenses, except infractions, are classified as misde-
meanors. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West Supp. 1986). During the period between 1872 and
1939, section 270 was amended several times. None of these amendments, however, affected
the penalty. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970) (historical note).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970) (historical note). The pertinent part of the
statute provided:
If the father, during such violation, remains out of the state for 30 days, or if he
fails or refuses to comply with the order of a court of competent jurisdiction requir-
ing him to make any provision for the maintenance, support, medical treatment or
[Vol. 37
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California Supreme Court held that this felon-misdemeanor distinction
was unconstitutional. 25 The current version of section 270 contains a
felony-misdemeanor distinction based upon a prior adjudication of pa-
rental status. Failure to provide child support is chargeable as a misde-
meanor;26 however, if the obligor parent previously has been adjudicated
the legal parent of the child, he may be charged with felony nonsupport.
The felony portion of the statute provides:
If a court of competent jurisdiction has made a final adjudication
in either a civil or a criminal action that a person is the parent of a
minor child and the person has notice of such adjudication and he or
she then willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary
'clothing, food, shelter, medical attendance or other remedial care for
his or her child, this conduct is punishable by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year or in a state prison for a determinate
term of one year and one day, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars ($2,000), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
27
State criminal statutes such as section 270 were designed to supple-
ment civil statutes for effective enforcement of child support obliga-
tions.28 Generally, civil enforcement is attempted first.29 In California,
other remedial care of such minor child and remains out of the state for 10 days
without doing so, he is guilty of a felony.
25. The court reasoned that imposing additional criminal liability solely because an indi-
vidual chooses to remain outside the state violates the equal protection clauses of the United
States and California Constitutions. In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 236, 474 P.2d 983, 989, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 15, 21 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
26. The first sentence of the statute provides:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his
or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1986).
27. Id.
28. Lee, District Attorney Collection of Child Support: The Need for Reform, 55 CAL. ST.
B.J. 156, 157 (1980);
29. Id. If both parents live in California, a California superior court may order child
support in a divorce or separation proceeding. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700 (West Supp. 1986). If
the parents were never married, or no support order was ever made, the obligee parent may
bring a support action on the child's behalf. Id. § 4703 (West 1983). A parent who fails to
provide court-ordered support may be found in contempt, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209.5
(West 1982), which is punishable as a misdemeanor. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 1970).
The support order may also be enforced by levying execution. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4380 (West
1983). If the obligee parent lives in California and the obligor parent does not, the obligee
parent may file a civil suit for enforcement of a support obligation in a California superior
court. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1672.5, 1673 (West 1982). Upon request by the court or
the obligee parent, the district attorney must represent that parent in this initial support pro-
ceeding. Id. § 1674. The court must then determine whether the complaint states facts from
which a duty of support could be inferred, see CAL. CIv. CODE § 196 (West 1982), and
whether a court of the state where the obligor parent lives can obtain jurisdiction over the
obligor parent. If a duty is found and jurisdiction can be obtained, the initiating superior court
July 1986]
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if the civil proceeding does not result in fulfillment of the support obliga-
tion, the district attorney may commence a criminal action for violation
of Penal Code section 270. If the obligor parent is in another state, the
district attorney would be forced to initiate extradition proceedings.
30
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act coordinates
civil and criminal statutes in an effort to enforce child support obliga-
tions. This effort is a vast improvement over the common law, but as this
Note demonstrates, the holding in Gregori frustrates this effort by elimi-
nating the possibility of a felony sentence for failure to provide child sup-
port. The statute as interpreted in Gregori fails to address the problems
caused by nonsupport.
Nonsupport and the Trend Toward Decreased Public
Responsibility for Children
Despite the availability of civil and criminal enforcement proce-
dures, many child support obligations remain unfulfilled.31 Such nonsup-
port is increasingly responsible for the growing poverty rate among
children in this country, 32 whose circumstances are exacerbated by the
conservative trend in recent years away from public responsibility for
what many consider private obligations, such as child support.33 This
trend, partly a reaction to pressures to reduce government spending and
balance the federal budget,34 has supplanted the efforts of the 1960's to
eliminate poverty through increased social welfare spending. 35 The over-
all effect of this fiscally conservative trend is decreased public responsibil-
ity and increased reliance on the private sector.36 Two commentators
note that "the conservative insistence on reducing government services
amounts to a simple reaffirmation of private responsibility, with the view
that 'need' should be as severe as possible to justify state action and pub-
will issue a certificate stating that jurisdiction can be obtained and will send the complaint and
the certificate to a court in the responding state. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1676 (West 1982).
The prosecuting attorney in the responding state must then prosecute the case diligently. Id.
§ 1680(b). If the responding state finds a duty of support it may issue a support order, id.
§ 1682, containing whatever conditions it deems necessary to assure compliance. Id. § 1685.
30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1660 (West 1982).
31. See CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 2; infra text accompanying note 48.
32. See infra notes 47-48 & accompanying text.
33. Wallop, The Last Campaign-Child Support and Poverty, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 1467,
1471 (1983).
34. W. GRUBB & M. LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS FAIL THEIR
CHILDREN 48, 83 (1982).
35. Id. at 47; see also Wallop, supra note 33, at 1467.
36. See Wallop, supra note 33, at 1471. Child-rearing was not always considered a
strictly private responsibility. In colonial times children were more often thought of as a com-
munity responsibility. W. GRUBB & M. LAZERSON, supra note 34, at 45. For a discussion of
private versus public responsibility, see id. at 45-51.
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lie remedy as limited as possible."
'37
One severe38 result of this trend has been a decrease in public re-
sponsibility toward children in particular.39 While children have been
called "America's richest resources," 4° the very deep, private love for our
own children contrasts sharply with the decline of any sense of "public
love" for children in general,41 evidenced by decreased expenditures on
programs and services for the general welfare of children-nutrition pro-
grams, child health care programs, and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC").42 Public opinion polls in California also indicate
that welfare, day care, and parks and recreation programs-programs
primarily affecting children-are the top priorities for spending
reductions.
43
This decreased public responsibility toward children comes at a time
when the rising childhood poverty rate indicates that children need pub-
lie support most. While some argue that the war on poverty is being
waged quite successfully in this country,44 children in female-headed
households undeniably continue to lose ground.45 The majority of such
children live in poverty; as a class, their poverty rate is over two and one-
half times that of the group with the next highest rate.
46
37. W. GRUBB & M. LAZERSON, supra note 34, at 48.
38. "Poverty, the poverty of civilized man, which is everywhere coexistent with unbound
wealth and luxury, is always ugly, repellant and terrible either to see or experience: but when
it assails the cradle, it assumes its most hideous form." Id. at 186 (quoting J. SPARGO, THE
BrrrER CRY OF THE CHILDREN (1906)).
39. Perhaps the primary example in California of this erosion in public responsibility was
the 1978 enactment of Proposition 13. CAL. CONST. art. 13A. Within a year of its enactment,
the Proposition reduced the property tax revenue, which funds public education, by seven
billion dollars. G. KAUFMAN & K. ROSEN, THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT 2 (1981).
40. G. KAUFMAN & K. ROSEN, supra note 39, at 83 (quoting President Lyndon Johnson
as reported in Cates, The Political Struggle for Equality of Educational Opportunity, in To-
WARD NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: THE SOCIAL POLICIES OF THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON AD-
MINISTRATIONS 326, 339 (D. Warner ed. 1977)). "What the best and wisest parent wants for
his own child, that must the community want for all of its children." G. KAUFMAN & K.
ROSEN, supra, at 43 (quoting J. DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 3 (1899)).
41. W. GRUBB & M. LAZERSON, supra note 34, at 51-52.
42. See id. at 84.
43. Id.
44. See, eg., Wallop, supra note 33, at 1467 (asserting that "in many respects the war on
poverty has been won in this country").
45. Id. at 1468. Even Republican Senator Wallop is willing to concede that poverty re-
mains a major problem for female-headed families.
46. MONEY INCOME, supra note 5, at 20-22. While nonsupport is just as much a crime
whether committed by a mother or a father, these statistics indicate that it is a more serious
problem for female-headed families. Fifty-six percent of all children in female-headed house-
holds are living below the poverty level, compared with only 21% of all children in all types of
households. These figures may be misleadingly optimistic. The official poverty line is based
upon the Department of Agriculture's Thrifty Food Plan, which is designed for temporary,
emergency use only. The Department itself estimates that only 10% of the people using the
plan would be able to eat an adequate diet. W. GRUBB & M. LAZERSON, supra note 34, at 187.
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Decreased public responsibility toward children affects the problem
of child support as well. The House Committee on Finance stated in a
recent report: "The problem of welfare in the U.S. is, to a considerable
extent, a problem of the non-support of children by their absent parents
S... ,47 Of all women due child support in 1981, less than forty-seven
percent received the full amount due, and over twenty-eight percent re-
ceived nothing at all.48 Many officials view child support disputes as
merely family matters and "court cloggers" and, therefore, give them low
priority. 49 Some officials advocate the removal of the nonsupport issue
from the criminal realm and even from the public sector altogether.5 0
The consequences of nonsupport are most evident among female-
headed households simply because such households are more numerous;
there are over four times as many female-headed households with no
male present as there are male-headed households with no female pres-
ent.51 In addition, women are still paid significantly less than men for
the same or comparable jobs, 52 and a disproportionate number of women
still work in unskilled, low-paying jobs.
53
Although nonsupport is already a very serious problem, it is likely
to get worse. The current divorce rate indicates that the number of fe-
male-headed households undoubtedly will increase.54 Until the pay ineq-
uities between men and women who perform the same or comparable
jobs are eliminated and more women obtain skilled, higher-paying jobs,
the increased divorce rate will result in an increased poverty rate among
female-headed households. According to one study, roughly half of all
children born in 1978 will have lived in female-headed, single-parent
households before reaching the age of eighteen.5 5 Two-thirds of that
47. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., CHILD SUPPORT
DATA AND MATERIALS 3 (1975).
48. CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
49. Wallop, supra note 33, at 1473-74.
50. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 28, at 161. This view arises from the feeling that disputes
over child support are often very complicated and emotional ramifications of some other dis-
pute, such as custody or visitation. Many men feel that withholding child support is their only
leverage for ensuring visitation. See L.A. Daily J., May 15, 1984, at 4, col. 1. The obligation
to support one's children should not, however, be affected by anything extrinsic to the obliga-
tion. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4382 (West 1983) (existence or enforcement of a duty of support
is unaffected by failure or refusal of the custodial parent to cooperate with custody or visitation
orders).
51. MONEY INCOME, supra note 5, at 20.
52. On average, women earn approximately 62% of what men earn for the same jobs.
L.A. Daily J., Apr. 26, 1984, at 4, col. 1; see M. WINSTON & T. FORSHER, NONSUPPORT OF
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN BY AFFLUENT FATHERS AS A CAUSE OF POVERTY AND WELFARE
DEPENDENCE 12 (1971).
53. M. WINSTON & T. FORSHER, supra note 52, at 12.
54. See CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
55. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1614, 1616 (1982).
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group, or one-third of all children, will receive AFDC at some time
before reaching the age of eighteen in 1996.56 Each of these rates is fifty
percent higher than that for children born in the 1960's.57
Thus, nonsupport is not only a serious social problem, but also a
serious drain on public resources. When child support obligations are
not met or effectively enforced, the family frequently is forced to seek
public assistance.58 This state intervention is contrary to the currently
popular preference for less government involvement in what are consid-
ered private obligations, 59 yet the breadth of the problem cannot be ig-
nored. For example, welfare expenditures are a particularly important
consideration in California, where 6.3% of the residents receive
AFDC.60 The effect of nonsupport on taxpayers in the form of welfare
expenditures is clear. A substantial decrease in nonsupport would result
in significant savings on public assistance.
As demonstrated, nonsupport must be treated as a serious social and
economic problem. In light of the trend toward decreased public respon-
sibility, enforcement of private support obligations becomes particularly
important. The decision in People v. Gregori,61 however, has undermined
this objective by eliminating felony prosecution as a sanction for failure
to provide child support. This Note demonstrates that the serious
problems caused by nonsupport require inclusion of a constitutional fel-
ony-misdemeanor distinction in section 270.
The Gregori Decision
California Penal Code section 270 prescribes a misdemeanor penalty
for failure to provide support for one's children and a felony penalty for a
violator who previously has been adjudicated the parent of the chil-
dren. 62 In 1983, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
held, in People v. Gregori,63 that this felony-misdemeanor distinction vio-
lated the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Califor-
nia Constitutions. 4 The defendant, Gregori, had been adjudicated the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See M. WINSTON & T. FORSHER, supra note 52, at 17. Public assistance is generally
provided in the form of AFDC. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11250-11270 (West 1980
& Supp. 1986). It may also be provided in the form of health care and services for the needy.
Id. §§ 14000-15520. Only 15% of welfare mothers with an absent father ever receive any child
support. Wallop, supra note 33, at 1472.
59. See supra notes 31-37 & accompanying text.
60. California ranks third in percentage of residents on welfare, behind only Michigan,
with 8.3%, and Illinois, with 6.4%. San Francisco Chron., Sept. 23, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
61. 144 Cal. App. 3d 353, 192 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1983).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1985).
63. 144 Cal. App. 3d 353, 192 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1983).
64. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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father of Matthew S. in a 1974 civil proceeding. As a result, Gregori was
ordered to pay fifty dollars per month for Matthew's support. Gregori
failed to pay the required child support, and on December 31, 1980, was
charged with four felony violations of section 270: one count for each
two month period between January 1, 1980, and August 31, 1980, during
which child support was not paid.
65
The jury, having found that Gregori had failed to pay the support
ordered and that he previously had been adjudicated Matthew's father,
convicted him on all four counts. The superior court ordered a sus-
pended sentence and a five-year probation, conditioned upon Gregori
serving one year in county jail and thereafter paying fifty dollars per
month in child support, plus an additional fifty dollars per month to
compensate for the payments he had missed.
66
On appeal, Gregori argued that section 270 violated the equal pro-
tection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions in two
respects: first, the requirement that the district attorney actively pursue
parents who fail to support children on welfare resulted in both selective
prosecution 67 and creation of a suspect classification based on wealth,68
and second, the statute impaired the fundamental right of access to the
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection provisions in the California Constitution,
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16, ("All laws of a general nature have uniform operation .... "); id.
art. I, § 7(b) ("A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not
granted on the same terms to all citizens."), are "substantially the equivalent of the equal
protection clause" of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Dep't of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330
(1965).
65. This case was not Gregori's first encounter with the criminal justice system. In July
1977, Gregori was charged with two misdemeanor violations of section 270: the first for the
period June 1, 1976, through November 30, 1976; the second for the period December 1, 1976,
through May 31, 1977. After a mistrial, the complaint was amended to add two additional six
month periods: September 1, 1977, through February 28, 1978, and March 1, 1978, through
August 31, 1978. Although the jury determined that Gregori was Matthew's father on the
basis of the prior civil proceeding, it found him not guilty on all four counts. Gregori, 144 Cal.
App. 3d at 357, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
66. Id. at 357-58, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
67. The district attorney is obligated to do whatever is necessary to obtain support for
children receiving public assistance, including determining paternity. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11475.1 (West Supp. 1985).
68. The United States Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a suspect classification.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980). Under the California Constitution, however,
wealth is a suspect classification and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Serrano v. Priest, 18
Cal. 3d 728, 765-66, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367 (1976). A classification that is
valid under the federal constitution is not automatically valid under the California Constitu-
tion. Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 365. The California Supreme Court deter-
mines what protection is to be given individuals under the California Constitution, subject only
to the qualification that its interpretations cannot restrict the guarantees accorded under the
federal constitution. Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366; see also People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 634, 493 P.2d 880, 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155 (1972). Therefore, if
violation of both federal and state constitutions is alleged, the analysis under the state constitu-
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courts.69 The court of appeal rejected Gregori's first contention, reason-
ing that Gregori produced no evidence that the district attorney selec-
tively enforced section 270.70 The court also found section 270 did not
create a suspect classification based on wealth because a child who re-
ceives public assistance does not necessarily have an indigent father.71
The court, however, found Gregori's other equal protection argu-
ment meritorious. 72 The court stated that the threat of future felony
prosecution posed by the statute might discourage a man from initiating
or participating in a paternity proceeding. 7 3 A man who initiates a pater-
nity proceeding to gain custody or visitation privileges necessarily be-
comes amenable to future felony prosecution under the statute. Because
the felony-misdemeanor distinction affected the fundamental right of ac-
cess to the courts, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review
to determine whether section 270 was constitutional. 74
tion will be the same as under the federal constitution except in those areas in which the state
constitution provides more protection.
69. Gregori, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 359, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558. The equal protection guaran-
tees require that the state government treat all similarily situated individuals in a similar man-
ner. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 423 (2d ed. 1983). This
requirement, however, is not absolute. Laws may classify persons for the purpose of determin-
ing who may exercise a particular right or interest or who is subject to a particular punish-
ment, but these classifications must be legitimate. Id.
The degree of legitimacy that is required varies with the nature of the right or interest
involved or the type of classification created. If the law relates only to matters of economic or
general social welfare, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
Such a law is presumed valid unless proven invidious, wholly arbitrary, or capricious and no
reasonable set of facts can be conceived to justify it. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
However, if a law impairs the ability to exercise a fundamental right or creates a suspect
classification, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities"), the government must prove that the law passes the
strict scrutiny test. Under this less deferential standard of review, the impairment or classifica-
tion must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (freedom of speech); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978)
(right to privacy); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (freedom of association); Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 92-93 (1965) (right to vote); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
478 (1954) (national origin); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (race).
There is also authority for the existence of a third category of equal protection analysis
under the United States Constitution, the quasi-suspect classification. Classifications recog-
nized as quasi-suspect include illegitimacy and gender. Statutes creating quasi-suspect classifi-
cations are subject to middle-level scrutiny: the statute will be upheld only when the
government can demonstrate that the classification is substantially related to an important
governmental objective. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982) (illegitimate children);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender).
70. Gregori, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 359-60, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
71. Id. at 360, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
72. Id. at 358-59, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59.
73. Id. at 359, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7007 (West 1983) (a child,
its mother, or a man presumed to be its father may initiate paternity proceedings).
74. Gregori, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 359, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59. The court cited City of
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Under the strict scrutiny standard, the state must demonstrate a
compelling interest justifying the law and must also prove that the dis-
tinction made by the statute is necessary to further that interest.75 While
the Gregori court recognized that the state's interest in enforcing child
support obligations was compelling, it also found that the felony-misde-
meanor distinction was not necessary to further that interest.76 The
court reasoned that the state's interest was not furthered by penalizing
those who had previously been adjudicated the father more severely than
those who had willingly admitted paternity.77 The court found that "a
paternity adjudication is a conceptually neutral factor" and is not indica-
tive of greater culpability. 78 Predicating guilt on this neutral factor ren-
dered the felony provision of section 270 unconstitutional, and the court
accordingly modified Gregori's convictions to represent a single
misdemeanor.
79
The result of Gregori is that nonsupport can no longer be prosecuted
as a felony in California. This Note demonstrates, however, that the seri-
ous problems caused by nonsupport require a constitutional felony-mis-
demeanor distinction in section 270.
Advantages to a Felony-Misdemeanor Distinction
Although the decision in People v. Gregori80 precludes felony prose-
cution of nonsupport, the serious problems caused by nonsupport, pri-
marily childhood poverty, demand amendment of section 270 to provide
for some kind of constitutionally permissible felony-misdemeanor dis-
tinction. There are several advantages to a nonsupport statute contain-
ing a felony-misdemeanor distinction. First, the misdemeanor charge
does not serve as an adequate deterrent by itself.8' Second, retention of
Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 530, 645 P.2d 137, 138, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87 (1982),
vacated, 459 U.S. 1095, reiterated, 33 Cal. 3d 727, 661 P.2d 1072, 190 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1983), to
support the proposition that access to the courts is a fundamental interest. In that case the
court held that the state government was prohibited from bringing a malicious prosecution
action against a person who previously had sued the state for false imprisonment. Allowing
such an action to be brought would have a chilling effect on persons wishing to bring similar
actions. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d at 535, 645 P.2d at 141, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 90. This decision was
based on both the federal and state constitutions. Id.
75. Gregori, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
76. Id. at 359, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
77. Id. The objection to the statute here appears to be that it was under-inclusive. See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 69, at 588.
78. Gregori, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 359, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
79. The court held that Gregori's four indictments reflected a continuing violation of
section 270 and could not be arbitrarily divided into units of time so as to result in multiple
counts. Id. at 361, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
80. 144 Cal. App. 3d 353, 192 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1983).
81. See infra notes 84-122 & accompanying text.
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the misdemeanor charge alone is not procedurally effective.8 2 Finally, a
felony-misdemeanor distinction would comport with legislative intent.
8 3
Deterrence
A felony-misdemeanor distinction in section 270 would serve as a
more effective deterrent against nonsupport for two reasons: first, the
possibility of a felony sentence is likely to prevent the crime from being
committed in the first place;84 second, the felony penalty will result in
stricter enforcement by law enforcement officials.85
Although in California the primary purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment, 6 the effect that the threat of punishment may have
in deterring crime should not be overlooked. There are two kinds of
deterrence-special and general.8 7 Special deterrence focuses on recidi-
vism; that is, the purpose of punishment is to deter an offender from
committing the crime again.8 8 General deterrence is aimed at the popu-
lation as a whole. The threat of conviction and sentencing reduces the
tendency of the general population to commit the crime.89
The nature of criminal nonsupport suggests that punishment
designed solely as a special deterrent would be ineffective in eliminating
the problems caused by the crime. Imprisoning the offender should be
the last resort. The interests of the victims, the children, 90 are only frus-
trated by imprisoning the parent, who would have greater difficulty pro-
viding child support while serving time in prison.
Although a prison sentence is contrary to the children's immediate
needs, it may be argued that, once released, the defendant will never
again fail to provide support for those children. 91 This special deter-
rence, however, is probably too little, too late. After the defendant has
been threatened with civil and criminal action, been brought to trial and
convicted, appealed the conviction, and served the sentence, the children
will already have been deprived of a substantial amount of support. The
82. See infra notes 123-32 & accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 133-42 & accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 86-119 & accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 120-22 & accompanying text.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986).
87. See Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE
AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME
RATES, 95-96 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, & D. Nagin eds. 1978).
88. Id. at 95.
89. Id. at 96.
90. The custodial parent-usually the mother-is also a victim. This parent must attempt
to enforce the support obligation and must struggle to compensate for the noncustodial par-
ent's failure to provide support.
91. It can also be argued that, rather than having a rehabilitative effect, prisons actually
are corruptive environments, especially now that the state seems to have abandoned any kind
of rehabilitative policy. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986).
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damage to them, possibly living in poverty and on welfare, will already
have been done. Thus, punishing the parent to deter repeated neglect of
the support obligation does not sufficiently prevent the biggest problem
caused by nonsupport, childhood poverty. Concern for the welfare of the
victims requires that any amendment of section 270 be directed toward
encouraging payment of support by discouraging nonsupport; that is, the
goal should be general deterrence to alleviate the pressing societal
problems caused by parents' failure to provide child support.
92
Whether punishment has any general deterrent effect depends on
several factors. These factors include the type of crime involved, 93 the
type of person sought to be deterred, 94 and whether the punishment vari-
able is certainty or severity. 95
There is evidence that the general deterrent effect of punishment
varies with the type of crime committed. 96 The rate of crimes of a more
emotional and spontaneous nature, such as murder and assault, seems
less responsive to general deterrence. 97 These crimes are often unplanned
responses to a given situation. Rational, economic crimes, on the other
hand, appear more amenable to general deterrence.98 One authority re-
fers to these crimes as "instrumental" crimes. 99 Such crimes usually are
not committed for any purely emotional reason or for the sake of plea-
sure. Instead, these crimes occur because their commission is "instru-
mental to the attainment of some other goal.' 1 ° For example, in the
case of a parking violation, the offender seeks to avoid the trouble of
finding a legal parking space. In the case of a white-collar crime, the goal
usually is economic enrichment. Such criminal behavior may range from
padding an expense account with a few unauthorized purchases to misap-
propriating thousands of dollars in corporate funds.
Although domestic relations are inherently complicated and emo-
tional, the crime of nonsupport is probably instrumental in nature. Like
parking violators and white-collar criminals, the parent sees ignoring his
or her support obligation as "instrumental to the attainment of some
other goal." In nonsupport situations, a parent is often providing for two
separate households with the same income that previously supported
only one. The noncustodial parent may have remarried and may be sup-
92. See supra notes 44-48 & accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 96-101 & accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 102-05 & accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 106-22 & accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Antunes & Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Impli-
cations for Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URBAN L. 145, 149-51 (1973).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 150.
99. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L.
REV. 703, 708.
100. Id.
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porting additional children or stepchildren. Support payments may also
be withheld in a calculated effort to retaliate against the custodial parent
or to force that parent to allow visitation.101 Thus, in these circum-
stances, the crime of nonsupport has an instrumental nature and, accord-
ingly, general deterrence would be effective.
The general deterrent effect of a particular crime's punishment also
depends on the type of person engaged in the criminal activity. For ex-
ample, a person who is committed to a life of crime, such as a career
burglar, may be less deterred by the possibility of punishment than would
an essentially law-abiding citizen.102 Nonsupporters are found in all so-
cial and economic levels and may otherwise be responsible, law-abiding
citizens. 103 Those with higher standards of living probably would suffer
greater loss as a result of serving time in prison. They would be stigma-
tized upon release from prison, making employment difficult to obtain.' °4
Since the percentage of parents committed to a criminal lifestyle proba-
bly is low, it appears that general deterrence would be quite effective
against the crime of nonsupport.10 5
Another factor in considering the effectiveness of general deterrence
is the punishment itself. Inverse relationships have been found between
crime rates and the sanction imposed.10 6 Two important elements of
these sanctions are severity of punishment and probability of imprison-
ment.10 7 The severity of punishment for violation of section 270 is not a
function of the length of the sentence, because there is virtually no differ-
ence between the length of a sentence imposed for a misdemeanor as
opposed to a felony. A misdemeanor conviction for a section 270 viola-
tion could result in a maximum sentence of one year in county jail, while
the maximum sentence for a felony conviction is one year and one day in
a state prison.10 8 Rather, the increased severity of a felony sentence is
determined by other consequences of imprisonment. As one court said,
"the burdens of a felony conviction are substantial and have a continuing
impact upon the convicted defendant even after he has served his term
"109
101. See, e.g., L.A. Daily J., supra note 50, at 4, col. 1.
102. See Chambliss, supra note 99, at 712-13.
103. See M. WINSTON & T. FORSHER, supra note 52, at 3-4, 15.
104. See infra notes 116-19 & accompanying text.
105. See Chambliss, supra note 99, at 712-13.
106. DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 87, at 96.
107. Antunes & Hunt, supra note 96, at 148-51.
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1985). In the event of an amendment to sec-
tion 270, the felony sentence is unlikely to be lengthened. In 1978, an attempt to establish a
determinate sentence in the range of sixteen months to three years for section 270 violations
was met with a howl of protest. See Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California:
The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 29 n.182 (1978).
109. In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 229 n.2, 474 P.2d 983, 985 n.2, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 17 n.2
(1970), cerL denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971).
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A felony conviction, as compared with a misdemeanor conviction,
may result in the following harsher consequences: a more severe sanc-
tion for failure to appear at trial; 1 0 a longer probationary period in lieu
of sentence;" 1 a longer parole period;" 2 and more severe penalties for
parole violation. 11 3 These variables amount to serious intrusions upon
the felon's liberty interest.
Felony convictions also may plague ex-convicts after they finish
serving their sentences. It is not uncommon for employers to ask an ap-
plicant whether he has ever been convicted of a felony. Indeed, certain
government agencies have access to an applicant's criminal record.' '
4
Even an arrest for a felony not resulting in a conviction remains on one's
criminal record and may cause problems in obtaining certain jobs.
1 5
An ex-felon carries a definite stigma not only in the job market" 
6
but in many other aspects of everyday life-such as renting an apart-
ment, applying for credit, and establishing social relationships. 1 7 Fur-
thermore, although the effects of a felony conviction on employment and
social status are very serious, the immediate consequences of a felony
conviction are even more serious. Conditions in county jails are certainly
bad enough, but they do not compare to the overcrowding and gang vio-
lence in state penitentiaries." 8 As one commentator stated, "difficulty in
obtaining a ... job is low on the list of concerns of most people on their
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320 (West Supp. 1986).
111. Compare id. § 1203.1 (allowing a maximum of five years probation for a felony with a
maximum sentence of less than five years) with id. § 1203a (limiting the probationary period
for a misdemeanor to a maximum of three years unless the misdemeanor sentence is longer).
112. Compare id. § 3000(a) (providing for a maximum parole period of three years for a
one year and one day felony) with id. § 308 1(b) (West 1982) (maximum parole period of only
two years for a misdemeanor).
113. Compare id. § 3057(a) (West Supp. 1986) (providing for up to 12 months confinement
of a felon whose parole is revoked) with id. § 3081(b) (West 1982) (misdemeanant may be
reimprisoned only for the remainder of the term unserved).
114. Id. §§ 11105 (West Supp. 1986), 13300 (West 1982).
115. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 1986) (forbidding an employer to ask
about arrest records although such records are supplied to employers statutorily entitled to
such information).
116. In one study, four groups, each consisting of 25 employers, were given the files of four
prospective employees. One of the four files in each group was an experimental file containing
either a record of conviction, an arrest without conviction, an arrest without conviction ac-
companied by a letter from the trial judge emphasizing that an acquittal means the defendant
was found not guilty, or no criminal record at all. The number of employers who expressed
interest in the experimental employee ranged from one for the ex-convict to nine for the appli-
cant with no criminal record. Homant & Kennedy, Attitudes Toward Ex-Offenders: A Com-
parison of Social Stigmas, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 383, 384 (1982).
117. Franklin, Richman, & Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records-Concealment and Dis-
honesty in an Open Society, 17 STAN. LAW. 22, 22 (1982).
118. Younger, Not Completely Dead-But Seriously Injured: The Collateral Consequences
of Misdemeanor Arrest and Conviction, 52 L.A.B.J. 50, 50 (1976).
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way to [state prison]." 119
Including a felony-misdemeanor distinction in section 270 also is
likely to affect the way nonsupport is viewed by law enforcement officials.
If a felony penalty were prescribed for violation of section 270, the crime
would likely be viewed more seriously and would be enforced more ag-
gresively by law enforcement agencies. 120 Providing a severe sanction for
the crime of nonsupport, or for any crime, can only be an effective deter-
rent if the statute is actually enforced. Even a possible life sentence
would not serve as an adequate deterrent absent the threat of actual en-
forcement. Severity of punishment and certainty of punishment each af-
fect deterrence, but the severity has a much greater impact when coupled
with certainty of enforcement. 121 Misdemeanors are given low priority
by overburdened law enforcement agencies. One investigator, comment-
ing on the low priority given child support investigations by an under-
staffed district attorney's office, said, "After all, it's only a misdemeanor.
It's not in the same class with a burglary."122 These agencies may be
able to find more time and money to deal with the problem of nonsup-
port if the state demonstrated its intention to make the crime a high pri-
ority by punishing it as a felony.
Amending section 270 to include a felony-misdemeanor distinction
would help eliminate the problems caused by nonsupport. First and fore-
most, restoring a felony-misdemeanor distinction to section 270 would
serve as an effective deterrent against parental nonsupport. Both the na-
ture of the crime of nonsupport and the type of person who generally
commits it indicate that the reinstitution of a felony punishment would
help prevent the commission of this crime. Further, if the message com-
municated to law enforcement officials is that nonsupport is a serious
crime, stricter enforcement of the statute may result.
Procedural Advantages
Including a felony-misdemeanor distinction in section 270 would re-
sult in two major procedural advantages. A felony provision would both
facilitate prosecution of nonsupporters and allow for increased judicial
control over the parent charged with or convicted of the crime.
One area in which a felony provision would facilitate prosecution is
in the extradition process. It is easier to extradite a person located in
another state if that person is charged with a felony rather than a misde-
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., infra notes 122, 127 & accompanying text.
121. See Antunes & Hunt, supra note 96, at 150-51; Cook, Punishment and Crime: 4
Critique of Current Findings Concerning the Preventative Effects of Punishment, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 175-76 (Winter 1977).
122. M. WINSTON & T. FORSHER, supra note 52, at 4.
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meanor. 123 Although the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act provides for enforcement of out-of-state support orders 124 and extra-
dition of persons charged with misdemeanor nonsupport, 125 extradition
is discretionary, not mandatory. 126 Some jurisdictions have limited ex-
tradition funds and therefore do not treat misdemeanor charges as seri-
ously as felony charges. Limited extradition funds are spent more readily
to extradite those charged with more serious offenses. 127
Another procedural advantage of felony prosecution involves the in-
vestigation of nonsupport defendants. Inability to pay is a defense to a
criminal nonsupport charge.128 Although district attorneys have access
to defendants' tax records to rebut allegations of inability to pay, 129 tax
forms may not accurately reflect an individual's true financial position.
If the nonsupport were charged as a felony, the district attorney could
obtain a search warrant to gather the evidence needed to prove the non-
supporter's ability to pay. 130  This evidence might include banking
records and receipts of expenditures, which could be helpful in determin-
ing a parent's true income.
Besides facilitating prosecution, reinstitution of a felony-misde-
meanor distinction in section 270 would give the court greater control
over nonsupport defendants. A parent charged with a felony and re-
leased on his own recognizance will have more incentive to appear for
trial because failure to appear at trial for a felony is itself considered a
felony, whereas failure to appear at trial for a misdemeanor is only a
misdemeanor.' 3' The court may also retain control over a person con-
victed of a felony for a longer period of time: the court may grant a
123. See, e.g., Cassou & Taugher, supra note 108, at 29 (listing section 270 as one of the
few criminal statutes in which a possible one year and one day sentence is still specified for
purposes of extradition).
124. UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 11, 9A U.L.A. 681 (1979).
125. Id. § 5, 9A U.L.A. at 664.
126. Id. § 5(2), 9A U.L.A. at 664.
127. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (Vernon 1979) (The Comment to the 1973 pro-
posed code noted that, while Missouri did not have sufficient funds for extradition of nonsup-
porters at the time, funds might sooner be made available if nonsupport were a felony.); see
also L.A. Daily J., May 15, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (An attorney with the National Center on Women
and Family Law in New York City stated that an out-of-state court order for child support
payments is given very low priority.).
128. People v. Cased, 129 Cal. App. 88, 92, 18 P.2d 389, 390-91 (1933); accord People v.
Cressey, 2 Cal. 3d 836, 844, 471 P.2d 19, 25, 87 Cal. Rptr. 699, 705 (1970).
129. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(l)(6)(A) (Supp. 11 1984); see Miller v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App.
3d 145, 149, 139 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1977) ("[T]he time has arrived when a policy favoring
the confidentiality of tax returns must give way to the greater public policy of enforcing child
support obligations.").
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(4) (West 1982) (search warrant will be granted when
the property or things to be seized constitute evidence tending to show that a felony has been
committed).
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320 (West Supp. 1986).
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longer probationary period in lieu of sentencing when the conviction is
for a felony; felons may be given longer parole periods; and the conse-
quences of a parole violation are more severe for felons than for
misdemeanants.1
32
In sum, including a felony-misdemeanor distinction in section 270
would yield two significant procedural advantages: facilitation of prose-
cution of nonsupporters and increased judicial control over parents
charged with or convicted of the crime of nonsupport.
Legislative Intent
Since Gregori,133 nonsupporters can only be charged with misde-
meanors. This scheme of enforcement is contrary to legislative intent in
two respects. The California Legislature has expressed a policy of pro-
portionate punishment, and it has further expressed the clear intention
that section 270 contain a felony-misdemeanor distinction of some sort.
The California Legislature has declared that "[t]he purpose of im-
prisonment for crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by
terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense .... - 134 Making all
section 270 violations misdemeanors, while other, less serious offenses
are prosecuted as felonies, is inconsistent with the legislative intent ex-
pressed in this proportionate punishment clause. For example, grand
theft, defined in part as the taking of money, labor, or real property of a
value greater than $400 or crops valued at over $100 is punishable as a
felony.1 35 It is inconsistent with the goal of proportionate punishment
that the direct taking of $400 is a felony while the indirect taking of the
same or greater amount from a child, by failure to pay support, is not.
132. See supra notes 111-13 & accompanying text.
133. In Gregor!, the court held that a felony sentence could not be imposed, making a
violation of section 270 a misdemeanor. Gregori, 144 Cal. App. 3d 353, 359, 192 Cal. Rptr.
555, 559 (1983).
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986).
135. Id. § 489. Section 487 of the California Penal Code reads:
Grand theft is theft committed in any of the following cases:
I. When the money, labor or real or personal property taken is of a value exceeding
... ($400); provided, that when domestic fowls, avocados, olives, citrus or deciduous
fruits, other fruits, vegetables, nuts, artichokes, or other farm crops are taken of a
value exceeding ... ($100); provided, further, that when fish, shellfish, mollusks,
crustaceans, kelp, algae, or other aquacultural products are taken from a commercial
or research operation which is producing that product, of a value exceeding...
($100); provided, further, that where the money, labor, real or personal property is
taken by a servant, agent or employee from his principal or employer and aggregates
... ($400) or more in any 12 consecutive month period, then the same shall consti-
tute grand theft.
2. When the property is taken from the person of another.
3. When the property taken is an automobile, firearm, horse, mare, gelding, any
bovine animal, any caprine animal, mule, jack, jenny, sheep, lamb, hog, sow, boar,
gilt, barrow or pig.
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Expressed another way, the legislature could not have intended that the
taking of $100 worth of artichokes should be considered a more serious
crime, as determined by the punishment prescribed, than the willful fail-
ure to provide the support necessary for the survival of one's child.
The elimination of the felony-misdemeanor distinction in section
270 allows more serious offenders, such as those who flee the state in
order to avoid their support obligations, or those who are in violation of
a court order for support, 136 or those whose crimes cause more serious
consequences to their victims, 137 to be punished as lightly as all other
nonsupporters. Since the legislature intended that more serious crimes
be punished more severely, the current status of section 270 is contrary
to legislative intent and must be amended.
The California Legislature also has expressed the clear intent that
section 270 contain a felony-misdemeanor distinction of some sort. The
statute has included such a distinction since 1939.138 The distinction in
the 1939 version of section 270 imposed more severe punishment on the
more culpable parents, those who fled the state or remained outside the
state for purposes of avoiding child support obligations. 139 This distinc-
tion was held an unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel and
to choose one's domicile. 14°
After the invalidation of the felony-misdemeanor distinction based
on the parent's residence or location in 1971, the legislature immediately
reaffirmed its intent to impose felony penalties on some forms of nonsup-
port by amending the statute in 1971. This amendment, subsequently
invalidated by the holding in Gregori, created a felony-misdemeanor dis-
tinction based on a prior adjudication of parenthood.141
Although legislative intent is immaterial to an equal protection anal-
ysis when fundamental rights or interests or suspect classifications are
involved, 42 the California Legislature, and, therefore, the people of Cali-
fornia, have shown a clear intent that the more culpable nonsupporters
should be charged with a felony rather than a misdemeanor. A constitu-
tional felony-misdemeanor distinction in Penal Code section 270, in addi-
tion to giving effect to this intent, would provide increased deterrence
and increased procedural effectiveness through facilitation of prosecution
and judicial control. In addition, incorporation of a felony-misde-
136. See supra note 24 & accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 47-48 & accompanying text.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970) (historical note).
139. Id.
140. In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 234, 474 P.2d 983, 988, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20 (1970) (strik-
ing down 30 day absence provision); see also People v. Temple, 20 Cal. App. 3d 540, 544-45, 97
Cal. Rptr. 794, 796-97 (1971) (applying the same rationale to void a 10 day absence provision).
For the text of this statute, see supra note 24.
141. For the text of the statute, see supra text accompanying note 27.
142. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 69, at 423-24.
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meanor distinction that discourages the crime itself would go far toward
eliminating the adverse social and economic effects of nonsupport.
Proposal
In light of the serious problems caused by nonsupport, the particu-
lar felony-misdemeanor distinction eventually adopted should be specifi-
cally directed at eliminating the most destructive consequence of
nonsupport-childhood poverty. 143 Also, in consideration of Califor-
nia's express policies of punishing rather than rehabilitating criminals,
and imposing punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the of-
fense, 14 the distinction should be based on the offender's culpability. A
felony-misdemeanor distinction based on the duration of nonsupport or
on a prior conviction of nonsupport would satisfy these criteria. Further-
more, such a distinction would survive constitutional scrutiny.
This Note proposes that the second sentence of California Penal
Code section 270, the provision for a felony penalty, be amended to read
as follows:
If the conduct for which the parent is convicted under this section
has continued for a period of more than six months, or if there has
been a prior conviction under this section, this conduct shall be pun-
ishable by imprisonment in a state prison for a determinate term of one
year and one day.14
5
The proposed felony-misdemeanor distinction would withstand
equal protection analysis under both the California and United States
Constitutions. Since it does not impair any of the defendant's fundamen-
tal rights and does not create a suspect classification, the amendment
would not be subject to review under the strict scrutiny standard.146 In
143. See People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 287, 437 P.2d 495, 500, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 12
(1968) ("Rather than punishment of the neglectful parents, the principal statutory objectives
are to secure support of the child and to protect the public from the burden of supporting a
child who has a parent able to support him.").
144. See id.; supra note 134 & accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 26-27 & accompanying text for text of section 270 as currently
formulated.
146. Interests that have been found to be fundamental include all of the Bill of Rights
except: the seventh amendment right to jury trial in civil cases, Minneapolis & S. L. R.R. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 216 (1916), the fifth amendment right to a grand jury, Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), and the second amendment, which has been held to be
not applicable to states because it is considered merely a prohibition against federal interfer-
ence with state militia, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). The status of the
third amendment is unknown since it has never been constitutionally litigated. J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 69, at 455-56. In addition, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized several other rights not expressly protected by the Constitution as deserving protection.
These include: freedom of association; right to vote; right to interstate travel; procedural due
process; the right to fairness in procedures concerning individual claims against governmental
deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and the right to privacy. See id. at 453-54, 460.
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particular, in contrast to the penal distinction struck down in People v.
Gregori, 147 the proposed amendment would not impair the fundamental
right of access to the courts. A putative father would not be discouraged
from participating in a paternity proceeding because the proposed felony-
misdemeanor distinction is in no way related to a prior civil action.
148
Also, it is well established that increased punishment may be imposed on
repeat offenders.' 49 In fact, the Gregori court in dicta stated that a felony
sentence for second-time offenders would be constitutional.' 50
The proposed distinction also does not create any suspect classifica-
tions. At this time, the United States Supreme Court recognizes only
two suspect classifications under the United States Constitution: race
1 5'
and national origin.' 52 The California Constitution additionally recog-
nizes classifications based on wealth as suspect. 53 The proposed amend-
ment contains no reference to race or national origin. Furthermore,
because inability to pay is a defense in a nonsupport prosecution, 54 an
argument that the proposed felony-misdemeanor distinction creates a
suspect classification according to wealth lacks merit.
Since the proposed amendment neither impairs a fundamental inter-
est nor creates a suspect classification, the felony-misdemeanor distinc-
tion need only pass the traditional rational relationship test to survive
equal protection scrutiny under the California and United States Consti-
tutions.155 Under this test, the distinction or classification must bear
only a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. 56 In
the context of nonsupport, the state has a legitimate interest in enforcing
child support obligations. Enforcement of these obligations is necessary
to protect the welfare of children and to limit the use of public funds on
behalf of children whose parents are able to support them. 
57
147. 144 Cal. App. 3d 353, 359, 192 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (1983).
148. Also, the proposed felony-misdemeanor distinction would not impair the right to
travel and choose one's place of domicile, a deficiency that proved fatal to earlier versions of
section 270. See supra notes 24, 140 & accompanying text.
149. People v. McDaniels, 165 Cal. App. 2d 283, 286, 331 P.2d 450, 452 (1958).
150. See Gregori, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 558 ("Had Gregori previously
been convicted of violating section 270 his present felony conviction would withstand constitu-
tional attack."). However, as the felony-misdemeanor distinction itself was held unconstitu-
tionally overbroad, it seems that section 270 can currently be prosecuted only as a
misdemeanor. Id. at 359, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
151. Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
152. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
153. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 765-66, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367
(1976).
154. See supra note 128 & accompanying text.
155. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 69, at 586-87. The proposed dis-
tinction also does not create a quasi-suspect classification, such as gender or illegitimacy. See
supra note 69.
156. Id.
157. See In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 233, 474 P.2d 983, 988, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20 (1970).
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The longer a parent fails to provide support for his child the more
he jeopardizes the child's welfare and the more likely it becomes that the
child will be forced into poverty or onto public assistance. Consequently,
as the duration of nonsupport increases, the state's interest grows
stronger. Since the proposed amendment would result in more severe
punishment for those parents who fail to provide support for longer peri-
ods of time, it clearly bears a rational relationship to the state's legitimate
interests.
A felony-misdemeanor distinction based on the duration of the non-
support or prior convictions of nonsupport also would serve as an effec-
tive deterrent against the most destructive nonsupport behavior: that
which forces the unsupported children into poverty. 158 The longer chil-
dren remain unsupported, the more likely they are to fall below the pov-
erty level. These children may become a burden on the state, not only
because of the money that must be spent for their welfare, but also in
terms of the potential inherent in all children that remains unrealized
because of an impoverished childhood. The deterrent effect of the pro-
posed amendment will help to prevent childhood poverty by encouraging
parents to fulfill their support obligations.
As previously discussed, the instrumental, rather than emotional or
spontaneous, nature of the crime of nonsupport, 159 and the fact that
those who commit that crime generally are not career criminals,160 sug-
gest that a harsher sentence may have a general deterrent effect. The
harsher sentence also will communicate to law enforcement officials the
need to enforce section 270 strictly. The deterrent effect of the more se-
vere penalty coupled with increased enforcement will help reduce the
widespread childhood poverty caused by parental nonsupport. Addition-
ally, the proposed amendment makes the felony sentence mandatory,
rather than giving prosecutors the discretion to charge the parent with
either a felony or a misdemeanor, as in the most recent version of section
270 held unconstitutional in Gregori.161 The message to law enforcement
officials, that this is a crime with serious consequences, will be clear.
Finally, the proposed amendment meets the legislative requirement
that the punishment be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. 162
158. This kind of distinction has been incorporated into statutes in other states. E.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.375 (West Supp. 1985) (nonsupport for more than 90 days is punish-
able as a felony); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.020 (1983) (nonsupport for more than one year is
punishable as a felony).
159. See supra notes 96-101 & accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 102-05 & accompanying text.
161. Although the Gregori court found no evidence to support the defendant's claim that
the statute had been selectively enforced, see supra notes 67-70 & accompanying text, the pro-
posed amendment's limitation on prosecutorial discretion will reduce the likelihood that such
a claim could be successfully advanced in future cases.
162. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986).
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Felony-misdemeanor distinctions based upon violation of a court or-
der 163 or absence from the state in which the children live to avoid pro-
viding support 164 do not necessarily result in greater punishment for the
more serious offense. The parent who fails to provide court-ordered sup-
port is not only guilty of nonsupport but is also in violation of a court
order and, therefore, subject to contempt. 165 This behavior may be more
culpable in that it shows disrespect for the judicial system, but it shows
no greater culpability with regard to the felony offense charged, failure to
provide support for one's child.
Similarily, a parent who leaves California to avoid child support ob-
ligations is no more culpable than one who moves from one part of the
state to another for the same reason. Since all states have adopted the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, a fleeing parent, in
theory at least, can still be brought into court.166 A felony-misdemeanor
distinction based on absence from the state, therefore, does not provide a
harsher penalty for the more serious offense.
The distinction made in the proposed amendment, on the other
hand, does result in more severe punishment for the more serious offense.
Failure to provide support for one's children for one month is not as
serious as neglecting to provide support for six months, especially if the
result in the latter case is forcing the children into poverty or onto wel-
fare. The longer a child goes without the support that his absent parent
is obligated to provide, the more likely it is that the child will become
impoverished or reliant on welfare.
A felony-misdemeanor distinction should be restored to California
Penal Code section 270 to deter parents from neglecting their support
obligations, to facilitate prosecution and judicial supervision of nonsup-
porting parents, and to comply with legislative intent. A felony-misde-
meanor distinction based on the amount of time the parent fails to
provide support or on repetition of the offense will serve all of these pur-
poses. Moreover, such a distinction responds to the need to deter the
kind of behavior that results in childhood poverty, provides for a harsher
penalty for the more serious offense, and withstands equal protection
analysis.
Conclusion
The prevalence of nonsupport in this country indicates that it is a
163. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 530.050 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (1979).
164. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-9902 (Harrison Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 568.040 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-621 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-2-2
(1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-7-16 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (1978).
165. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209.5 (West 1982); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 166
(West 1970).
166. UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 64 (1979).
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problem far from being solved. The serious consequences of this prob-
lem--childhood poverty and increased welfare expenditures-demon-
strate the need for a solution.
One solution to the problem is to treat failure to provide support for
one's children as the serious crime that it is. To do this, the legislature
must amend the criminal nonsupport statute to include a constitutional
and effective felony-misdemeanor distinction. The distinction must be
designed to deter the kind of criminal behavior that is most deleterious to
its victims-the children-and to our society. -
The amendment proposed by this Note is designed to deter the most
reprehensible criminal nonsupport behavior. It provides a more severe
penalty for the most culpable parents: those who repeatedly fail to pro-
vide support for their children, thus possibly subjecting the children to
poverty and burdening our welfare systems. Furthermore, a felony-mis-
demeanor distinction based on the duration of nonsupport passes consti-
tutional scrutiny. The proposed amendment, therefore, would be a step
toward eliminating the problems caused by nonsupport.
Kirsten Howe*
* Member, Second Year Class
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